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This paper will examine the ontological status of unidentified flying objects as it pertains to a series of 
Cold War United States Air Force investigations into unidentified aerial phenomena (also referred to as 
unidentified flying objects, or UFOs). Between 1947 and 1969, the USAF directed a number of projects 
meant to reveal the actual nature of UFOs. Project SIGN, the first of these inquiries, sought to discover 
whether or not these reported observations represented a national security threat. The answer being 
no,’ in the many projects thereafter UFOs became objects of scientific interest. 
 
Expert scientists from nearly every field of science were contracted for their assistance on identifying 
the true cause of the observation. Out in the world, the scientific community split into roughly three 
camps over the nature and existence of unidentified flying objects: there were the hard skeptics and 
non-believers; the cautiously curious; and the “true believers” who, in UFO witnessing, sought evidence 
of extraterrestrial intelligences. But within the boundaries of the sanctioned, federally-funded UFO 
investigations, scientists searched for all possible explanations for UFO phenomena, from the physical to 
the psychological. In over 80% of the tens of thousands of cases the Air Force programs reviewed, 
physical phenomena were accounted for as the cause but this leaves nearly 20% for which the 
conclusion was rendered Unknown.’ 
 
The question about the existence of a source for observed phenomena was always at the foreground of 
the investigations. In a majority of cases, actual phenomena fuel UFO reports; whether it was airplanes, 
meteors, meteorological phenomena, or the planet Venus, real physical objects account for a vast 
majority of reports. But what of those reports ultimately classed as unknown’? In his report-cum-expos 
of early Air Force investigative efforts, The Report on Unidentified Flying Objects (1956), former Project 
Blue Book director Captain Edward J. Ruppelt writes, “The hassle over the word proof’ boils down to one 
question: What constitutes proof?... There are certain definite facts that can be gleaned from [a report]; 
the pilot did see something and he did shoot at something, but no matter how thoroughly you 
investigate the incident that something can never be positively identified.” Some sightings might be 
psychological, as with hallucinations; but surely, Ruppelt argues, not all of them are. Likewise, in a set of 
anonymous survey interviews conducted by astronomer J. Allen Hynek in 1952, Astronomer R argues 
that as late as 1800 meteorites were thought impossible and that it would be folly to suggest that “a 
century and a half later all the physical phenomena that exist have been discovered.” Status report after 
status report supports the position that reported observations, in a gross majority of cases, are being 
generated by real phenomena. (And the reports in which this is not the case are easily identifiable, 
based on the character of the witness.) 
 
Historians of science are often quick to suggest ways in which their case studies and methodologies can 
be better applied to critical issues in the philosophy of science. But here, I attempt to work in the other 
direction, demonstrating how philosophical questions about the ontological status of scientific objects 
shapes methods of scientific inquiry and assumptions about observers and witnessing. (These 
assumptions work in multiple directions, as lay observers make claims on scientific authority based on 
their understanding of the importance of the empirical in the practical sciences.) Drawing on Hacking, 
Cartwright, and discussions around scientific realism, I will demonstrate how philosophical concerns 
about theoretical and un-seeable’ objects do not pertain only to the problems of the microscopic world. 
Furthermore, I will discuss how understanding these central philosophical questions on real versus 
immaterial objects is crucial to understanding, in this case, the UFO problem more broadly. The UFO 
case study allows us to see philosophy of science in action. It is a case of applied philosophy of science. 
 
Additionally, I hope to demonstrate that, in these histories of “fringe” science, an integrated approach is 
necessary for a truly productive analysis. Historical concerns are entwined with philosophical ones; a 
straight-laced historical analysis will miss the critical ontological and epistemological concerns that lie at 
the heart of these little-studied historical moments, while a purely philosophical inquiry may fail at 
demonstrating the importance of these “weird” events in the larger historical context. Philosophical 
positions lay at the heart of practical decision making, on a scientific and political level, while a historical 
narrative illustrating the change of those positions over time can help illuminate how those questions 
shaped and were shaped by outside forces. This paper is part of a larger project that both recovers the 
history of USAF studies on unidentified aerial phenomena and explores knowledge creation, 
classification, and distribution in the face of ontologically-unsound phenomena. 
 
